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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court excluded evidence of Cassidy H. Stone’s character for peacefulness in
this felony battery on a health care worker case, because battery was a general intent crime and
the character trait of peacefulness was therefore not relevant. Ms. Stone appealed, asserting the
district court erred when it excluded evidence of her character for peacefulness, because that
character trait was relevant to whether Ms. Stone had the requisite culpable state of mind to
commit a battery.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues that testimony that Ms. Stone had a reputation
for peacefulness was not relevant under these “unusual circumstances.” (See Resp. Br., pp.8-17.)
The State also argues that if the district court erred, the error was harmless.

(See Resp.

Br., pp.17-20.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s argument that the evidence of
Ms. Stone’s character for peacefulness was not relevant, which relies upon a dichotomy between
“normal circumstances” and “unusual circumstances” unsupported by caselaw from other
jurisdictions or the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Stone’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it excluded evidence on Ms. Stone’s character for peacefulness,
because that character trait was relevant to whether Ms. Stone had the requisite culpable state of
mind to commit a battery?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Excluded Evidence On Ms. Stone’s Character For
Peacefulness, Because That Character Trait Was Relevant To Whether Ms. Stone Had The
Requisite Culpable State Of Mind To Commit A Battery

A.

Introduction
Ms. Stone asserts the district court erred when it excluded evidence on her character for

peacefulness, because that character trait was relevant to whether she had the requisite culpable
state of mind to commit a battery. Reputation or opinion evidence that Ms. Stone had a character
trait for peacefulness would make it less likely that she purposely used force or violence upon
Ms. Gonzales’ body, or that she intended to touch or strike Ms. Gonzales. The district court
erred when it excluded this character evidence, and the State has not met its burden of proving
the district court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Evidence On Ms. Stone’s Character For Peacefulness Was Relevant To Whether She Had
The Requisite Culpable State Of Mind To Commit A Battery
Ms. Stone asserts evidence on her character for peacefulness was relevant to whether she

had the requisite culpable state of mind to commit a battery. Reputation or opinion evidence that
Ms. Stone had a character trait for peacefulness or non-violence would make it less likely that
she purposely used force or violence upon Ms. Gonzales’ body. See I.C. § 18-903(a). Likewise,
reputation or opinion evidence on her character for peacefulness would make it less likely that
she intended to touch or strike Ms. Gonzales. See I.C. § 18-903(b). Thus, Ms. Stone’s character
trait of peacefulness was pertinent, or relevant, to the battery on a health care worker charge by
making the material fact of her requisite culpable state of mind less probable. See State v.
Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 130 (Ct. App. 2013). The district court’s reasons for excluding the
character evidence were incorrect. Cf. State v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941 (Ct. App. 1990). The
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evidence of Ms. Stone’s character of peacefulness was admissible under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 404(a)(1).
In support of this assertion, Ms. Stone cited cases from some other jurisdictions holding
that a defendant’s character trait of peacefulness is relevant to a battery criminal case. (App.
Br., pp.16-17 (citing State v. Faafiti, 513 P.2d 697 (Haw. 1973); State v. Ervin, 451 P.2d 372
(Utah 1969); Seabrook v. State, 348 So.2d 663 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977) (per curiam).) The State
attempts to distinguish those cases from the instant case, on the basis that those cases ostensibly
“address[] the admissibility of testimony regarding the defendant’s reputation for peacefulness in
the context of violent and malicious attacks allegedly instigated by the defendant under relatively
normal circumstances.” (See Resp. Br., p.11.) The State contends that this case is different,
because “[t]hese were anything but ordinary circumstance[s] and testimony regarding a
reputation for peacefulness under ordinary circumstances would not in any way contravene the
proposition that [Ms.] Stone intended her foot to contact Nurse Gonzales here.” (See Resp.
Br., p.12.) According to the State, Ms. Stone’s reputation for peacefulness was not probative
because “she was inebriated” and “she believed she was being wrongfully detained and was
attempting to escape her captors.” (See Resp. Br., p.12.)
However, the above cases from other jurisdictions do not actually support the distinction
the State is trying to draw between “normal circumstances” and “unusual circumstances” for
purposes of relevance.

For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Faafiti held that the

defendant “has a clear right to introduce evidence of personal character traits associated with the
basic nature of the offense with which he is charged,” without adding a limit based on how
“normal” or “unusual” the circumstances of the offense were. See Faafiti, 513 P.2d at 641.
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Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court in Ervin held that, considering the crime charged
“involved both stealing and violence,” the jury “should not have been precluded from
considering the traits of honesty and integrity, nor of being peaceable and law abiding, which are
included in general good character.” See Ervin, 451 P.2d at 374. The Ervin Court did not cabin
its holding with language about how the circumstances presented in that case (a black man
accused of assaulting and robbing a woman at her rural Utah house in 1967, with the alibi being
that the man was out of the area at the time the alleged offense occurred) were “normal”. See id.
at 373-74.
Likewise, in Seabrook, the Florida District Court of Appeal held, “Certainly one’s lack of
propensity toward violence is relevant to the trait of violence inherent in the commission of an
aggravated battery or aggravated assault; so the trial court’s refusal to allow testimony as to an
appellant’s reputation with respect to that trait was error.” See Seabrook, 348 So.2d at 664. The
takeaway from the above cases is that those courts focused on the “nature of the offense”
charged when deciding whether evidence of a defendant’s character for peacefulness was
relevant, not on how “normal” or “unusual” the circumstances of the offense were. See, e.g.,
Faafiti, 513 P.2d at 641.
Further, the State’s purported dichotomy between “normal” and “unusual” circumstances
finds no support in the Idaho Rules of Evidence on relevance. Evidence is relevant if “it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” and “the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” I.R.E. 401(a) & (b). Relevant evidence is
generally admissible. See I.R.E. 402. In a criminal case, “a defendant may offer evidence of the
defendant’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it.” I.R.E. 404(a)(1)(A). The Idaho Court of Appeals has held: “In this context, the word
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‘pertinent’ is generally synonymous with ‘relevant.’ Thus, a pertinent character trait is one that
is relevant to the crime charged by making any material fact more or less probable.” Rothwell,
154 Idaho at 130. As seen above, the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not distinguish between
“normal” and “unusual” circumstances for purposes of relevance.
By arguing that Ms. Stone’s “reputation for peacefulness under normal circumstances,
when she is sober, provides no evidentiary value as to her behavior in these unusual
circumstances and while she is highly inebriated,” the State is really contending that the weight
of the evidence is limited, because of how dissimilar the facts of this case are from so-called
“ordinary circumstances.” (See Resp. Br., p.14.) However, “It is the province of the jury to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence.” State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho
298, 307 (Ct. App. 1984). The relevance of a particular item of evidence does not hinge on its
weight through its similarities to the situation in a given case, but rather on whether “it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See I.R.E.
401(a). In other words, the State’s argument would replace “any tendency” from Rule 401 with
a weight-oriented standard, and this change to Idaho’s long-standing rules on relevance should
be rejected.
Further, the State’s argument depends on the dubious proposition that the circumstances
here are “unusual” when compared to those in other cases. The State makes much of the fact
that Ms. Stone was intoxicated, but other courts have considered circumstances where a
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense and offered character evidence of
peacefulness. See, e.g., State v. Eakins, 902 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Wash. 1995) (“Eakins’ evidence
of peaceful character when not influenced by drugs and alcohol was offered in support of expert
testimony that his drug and alcohol abuse caused a mental condition that reduced or eliminated
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his ability to form specific intent.”); State v. Donhauser, 435 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Neb. 1989)
(“[T]he defendant produced testimony that he was too intoxicated to be able to form the requisite
intent and that he had a character for peacefulness.”). Moreover, the evidence that Ms. Stone
was trying to leave the room and not cooperating is not so different from the evidence in some
cases where the defendant (unlike here) made a self-defense claim. See, e.g., State v. Renner,
912 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tenn. 1995) (explaining that the defendant in a murder case had asserted
self-defense, where he claimed he heard the victim load a firearm, went to leave, and saw the
victim reach into his pocket and threaten to kill him); State v. Williams, 87 S.W.2d 175, 180
(Mo. 1935) (“At the trial [the defendant] swore she was endeavoring to open the door and go
outside when [the victim] forbade her to leave, jumped at her, and she shot him in selfdefense.”). Thus, the circumstances here are not so unusual after all.
Additionally, the State’s argument would create the anomalous situation where a person
accused of battery under circumstances like those in Ms. Stone’s case would not be able to
present evidence of their own character trait for peacefulness or nonviolence, but would be able
to present evidence of the alleged victim’s character trait for violence. See Marr v. State, 163
Idaho 33, 38 (2017).
Evidence on Ms. Stone’s character for peacefulness was relevant to whether she had the
requisite culpable state of mind to commit a battery.

Reputation or opinion evidence that

Ms. Stone had a character trait for peacefulness would make it less likely that she purposely used
force or violence upon Ms. Gonzales’ body, or that she intended to touch or strike Ms. Gonzales.
The district court’s reasons for excluding the character evidence were incorrect. The State’s
argument that the evidence of Ms. Stone’s character for peacefulness was not relevant relies
upon a dichotomy between “normal circumstances” and “unusual circumstances” unsupported by
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caselaw from other jurisdictions or the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Ms. Stone’s character trait of
peacefulness was pertinent, or relevant, to the battery on a health care worker charge by making
the material fact of her requisite culpable state of mind less probable. See Rothwell, 154 Idaho at
130.

The evidence of Ms. Stone’s character of peacefulness was admissible under

Rule 404(a)(1), and the district court erred when it excluded the evidence.

C.

The State Has Not Proven That The Error Is Harmless
Ms. Stone asserts the State has not met its burden of proving the district court’s error in

excluding the evidence on her character for peacefulness was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010); State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980).
The crucial issue in this case was whether Ms. Stone had the requisite culpable state of mind to
commit a battery on Ms. Gonzales. Evidence of Ms. Stone’s character trait for peacefulness
would have supported Ms. Stone’s theory of the case that she was kicking to try and get off the
bed, and accidentally made contact with Ms. Gonzales, while undermining the State’s theory of
the case that she kicked Ms. Gonzales on purpose.
The State argues any error was harmless, because “the probative value of that evidence
was vanishingly slight and the properly admitted evidence concerning whether [Ms.] Stone
intended to make forceful contact with Nurse Gonzales was very strong.” (See Resp. Br., pp.1718.) The State’s argument on this point is unremarkable, and no further reply is necessary.
Thus, Ms. Stone would direct this Court’s attention to pages 22-23 of the Appellant’s Brief.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Stone respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s judgment of
conviction and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2020.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of June, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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